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Abstract  
 
This paper utilises a political lens in considering the cause for the production of corruption and 
the role of political leadership. Specifically, the notion of personalisation of power as 
advocated by Slater (2003) is adopted to portray how the adoption of neoliberalism ideology 
by an aspiring autocratic leader results in the weakening of the infrastructural power through 
three strategies: packing, rigging and circumventing. We use Perwaja Steel as a case study to 
demonstrate the modus operandi of corruption in a state-owned enterprise in Malaysia.  
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Personalisation of power, neoliberalism and the production  
of corruption  
 
1. Introduction 
Malaysia is often quoted as a good example of a successful moderate Islamic country 
(Borneopost, 28 June 2012). It is ranked as the “37th best country in the world and among the 
top three Asian countries in the global standing” for doing business (The Staronline, 21 August 
2010), and is also a world leader for Islamic finance.  Despite its impressive achievements, 
there are increasing underlying concerns over the last two decades on the growth and 
persistence of corruption in the country, which is not only destroying its international 
reputation as a safe and equitable environment for investment but also immensely harming the 
quality of life of its people (Ibrahim, 2013).  According to the Malaysian Anti-Corruption 
Commission, prosecution of corruption cases in the form of bribery, malpractices, abuse of 
power, criminal breach of trust, and misappropriation of funds has increased to 520 cases 
during 2011 as compared to 432 cases in 2010 (MACC, 2012).  In fact, Malaysia is ranked fifth 
(after China, Russia, Mexico, and India) among the top 10 countries for illicit capital flight, 
accounting for almost 40.3 percent of cumulative illicit financial flows from developing 
countries between 2003 to 2012 and ranked third (after China and India) among Asian countries 
in exporting illicit capital to rich countries (Global Financial Integrity, 2014). In spite of the 
major reforms in curbing corruption being launched by the past and current governments, it 
has continued to slide down in the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)1 ranking from 36th 
position in 2011 to 50th in 2014 (Global Financial Integrity, 2014).2  
 
1 Refer to Transparency International; CPI measures the perceived level of public-sector corruption in 183 
countries and territories around the world.  
2 Malaysia was ranked as the 53rd in 2013 Transparency International website, 2011 (accessed from 
 https://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results on 6 March 2015).   
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When Malaysia gained independence in 1957, corruption was hardly an issue but has 
grown since the 1970s. Furthermore, as an Islamic country with Muslim leadership, Malaysia 
is expected to be clean from corruption as Islam strongly forbids and condemns such 
malpractices. It is mentioned in the Hadith: “God cursed the one who pays a bribe, the one who 
takes it and the mediator between the two” (Sahih Muslim)3 and in the Quran (11:85): “And O 
my people! Give full measure and weight in justice and reduce not the things that are due to 
the people, and do not commit mischief in the land, causing corruption.” The question that 
arises is why corruption continues to grow and in fact, escalating to bigger scales in the country 
in recent years? 
The extant literature on corruption has acknowledged that it is a complex and 
multifaceted phenomenon, as it exhibits different forms and functions in diverse contexts, with 
multiple causes and effects (Brooks, Walsh, Lewis and Kim, 2013).  Nevertheless, there is 
mutual agreement that it entails the abuse of public power, roles or resources for private benefit 
(Amundsen, 1999; Johnston, 2005), which may exist at the interface between public and private 
sectors (Rose-Ackerman, 1978) or between international actors and host countries (see e.g. 
Rose-Ackerman 1999; Bayart et al., 1999).  One strand of studies in this area is on identifying 
the root causes and the appropriate preventive measures that can be taken.4  Discussion on the 
causes of corruption, which can be attributed to individuals, organizations, and institutions, has 
been grouped in the literature as either the demand-side (referring to the taking) or the supply-
side (referring to the giving) of corruption (Heimann and Boswell, 1998; Sikka & Lehman, 
2015). This strand of literature further classified the preventive solutions into control (aimed 
at improving legal, electoral, educational and other institutional systems), exit (alternatives or 
 
3 Cited in Islam message of peace, available at https://islammessageofpeace.wordpress.com/2014/04/29/riba-is-
haraam-for-the-one-who-takes-it-and-the-one-who-pays-it-and-it-is-haraam-to-help-with-it-in-any-way-
whatsoever/ 
4 For a good summary and overview of the literature on the definitions, consequences and causes of corruption, 
see Everett, Neu & Rahaman (2006), Tanzi (1998) and Andvig, Fjeldstad, Amundsen, Sissener & Søreide (2000). 
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substitutes available to actors in exiting the situation) and voice (respecting a wide array of 
perspectives, desires, and forms of practical knowledge) strategies (see Everett, Neu & 
Rahaman, 2006; 2007). These studies rightly acknowledged that this global problem and its 
subsequent solution will always be debatable as the field’s actors view the problem in different 
ways due to differences in the ‘‘idiomatic, epistemological, ontological and moral 
correspondences’’ (Rose and Miller, 1992; p. 179). 
In this paper, we seek to contribute to the debate on corruption using the lens of political 
power. We argue that the personalisation of power (Slater, 2003) by the political leadership 
imbued with neoliberalism ideology induced the production of corruption.  Using one of the 
largest financial scandals in a state-owned enterprise during the premiership of Mahathir 
Mohamad as a case study, we provide evidence on how an aspired autocratic leadership 
managed to personalised power and weakened the infrastructural apparatus that provides the 
necessary check and balance. This, in turn, facilitated the production of corruption on both the 
demand and supply side.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss the notion of 
personalisation of power and mechanisms of personalisation that can be utilised in 
transforming a democratic system into an autocratic regime as well as explain how the adoption 
of neoliberalism ideology may further facilitate the production of corruption. Section 3 presents 
the case study and discusses the modus operandi of the production of corruption, as well as the 
roles of the various actors.  The last section concludes the paper with some reflections and 
suggestions for further research. 
 
2. Personalisation of power, neoliberalism and the production of corruption 
The fundamental purpose of any democratic institutions is to provide stable patterns of popular 
representation. According to Mann (1988, p.5), one way this can be achieved is by constraining 
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the chief executive's ‘despotic power’, referring to the range of actions that an individual leader 
is empowered to take without routine, institutionalized negotiations with other regime members 
(i.e. the power to decide).  The raison d'etre in authoritarian institutions is to supply a regime 
with the ‘infrastructural power’ (i.e. the power to govern) which is necessary if command over 
potential opposition in civil society and within the multiple layers of the state apparatus itself 
is to be implemented.  In other words, while democratic institutions serve to keep the chief 
executive in check, authoritarian institutions serve to keep the opponents under wraps (Mann, 
1988).  According to Slater (2003), in semi democratic regimes, personalisation of power by 
any aspiring autocrat requires high levels of infiltration into infrastructural powers in order to 
command the whole country.  Three mechanisms that can be utilised by the aspiring autocrat 
to personalise his/her power include: packing, through commandeering the power of an existing 
institution for personal purposes; rigging, through the strategic modification of institutional 
rules and procedures to forestall competition for leadership positions; and circumventing 
through either the creation of entirely new organizations or demand for existing organizations 
to take on entirely new tasks which implies the squandering of at least a portion of a regime's 
institutional inheritance (Slater, 2003; p.91).  This process is further made possible in such 
regimes through the adoption of neoliberalism. 
Historically, neoliberalism ideologies as championed by Keynes were associated with 
the role of the state in constraining the mobility of capital and in redistributing wealth for a 
more equitable and just society (Sikka, 2015). However, over time, the idea of the control of 
capital by the state was challenged by Hayek (1944) who argues that market prosperity, 
stability and social justice can be achieved through free market and minimum state intervention 
while still providing minimum provision to those who cannot earn a living in the market 
(Tebble, 2010). During the late 1970s and early 1980s, Harvey (2005) observes further 
expansion of free market competition, mobility of capital and no state intervention in the 
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economic sphere in the name of attaining social efficiency.  This rebranding of neoliberalism 
resulted in total loss of state control over organisations and individuals and enabled competitive 
beings to indulge in endless pursuit of private gains and in legitimising their activities 
(Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005).  
The embracement of neoliberalism ideologies by western powers is not only confined in 
their own territories but also exported to other developing countries through foreign direct 
investments (Sikka, 2015) and other tools deemed necessary for modernising their economies. 
The neoliberalists have managed to convince the political elites in developing countries “that 
the system is natural, fair and fundamentally better than any realistic alternative” (Sklair, 1995; 
p.98), which in turn either directly or indirectly made them to believe in their own inferior 
socio-political and economic setting as compared to advanced nations. This inferiority complex 
results in political elites in developing countries to voluntarily embrace the structures and 
values of their western counterparts, as opposed to other alternatives that may be more suitable 
in fulfilling local needs, and may also be motivated by the obvious private rewards that can be 
gained through close relationship with business elites who needed them in order to survive in 
the competitive market. This symbiotic relationship led to the state becoming nothing more 
than a façade masking the realities of deeply personalised political relations, clientelism 
(including nepotism and cronyism), and political corruption (Hope and Chikulo 2000; Chabal 
and Daloz 1999). Adoption of neoliberalism weakened the distinction between public and 
private which dominates the politics of some countries, especially in Africa and some parts of 
South-East Asia.  
Unlike neoliberalist political leaders in democratic countries who are subject to public 
scrutiny if their style of reconfiguring the resources may have negative impact on society, their 
counterparts in developing countries may use mechanisms of personalisation of power to 
silence their opponents and critics especially when there is a lack or weakened infrastructural 
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power (public and legal institutions). 
Another outcome of the adoption of neoliberalism is crony capitalism, a system where 
significant parts of the economy are controlled by the government and political elites who will 
use the power of the state to make decisions in the best interests of a particular set of well-
connected businesses, rather than in the best interest of the market as a whole (Girling, 1997; 
Chang, 1998; Krugman, 1998; Wade, 1998; Haber, 2002). Harvey (2005) succinctly defined 
crony capitalism as corrupt relationships between the state and businesses.  In the extreme case, 
crony capitalism can degenerate into corruption when contracts and appointments are awarded 
to families and friends (nepotism) without merit or transparent procurement process.  Similarly, 
crony capitalism, assists in generating plutocracy, whereby a small minority of the wealthiest 
citizens rule the country (Phillips, 2004) or kleptocracy, where the political elites seek to 
increase their personal wealth often in the pretence of providing honest service to the society 
i.e. corruption rule by theft (Bush, 2006).  While both plutocracy and kleptocracy seem to 
favour the political elites, their closeness with business corporations including accounting 
firms, intensify the production of corruption.  
 
2.1 The Malaysian context  
Malaysian politics has been dominated by the National Front or Barisan Nasional (BN)5 
communal coalition party, with administration of the country being in the hands of the leader 
of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) political party. The country has been 
under six premierships6 including the present one. However, it was Mahathir’s twenty two 
years of premiership that has significantly transformed Malaysian political and socio-economic 
 
5 BN or the National Front Party was formed in 1973, replacing the Alliance Party which was formed in 1957. It 
consists of three communal political parties: the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), Malaysian Indian 
Congress (MIC) and the secular United Malays National Organisation (UMNO). There two political opposition 
parties before 1998 are the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) and the Democratic Action Party (DAP).  
6 Tunku Abdul Rahman (1957-1969), Abdul Razak (1969-1976), Hussein Onn (1976-1981), Mahathir 
Mohammad (1981-2003), Abdullah Badawi (2003-2009) and Najib Razak (2009 to present).   
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landscape that persists till the present day. According to Gomez and Jomo (1999), the 
neoliberal policies and discourses that assist in wealth accumulation and concentration through 
political patronage intensified during Mahathir’s administration.  When he came into power in 
19817, he was inspired by the success of the four Asian Tigers or Asian Dragons8 that had 
developed into advanced and high-income economies through rapid industrialisation. Hence, 
through his ‘Look East’ policy, Mahathir utilized greater state intervention to promote heavy 
industrialization to emulate Japan and South Korea. The state-sponsored and HICOM-led 
program of heavy industrialization was mostly implemented in joint-ventures with Japanese 
firms, and the HICOM enterprises were primarily financed by heavy borrowing from the 
Japanese government at very low interest rates (Jomo, 2003).  
In 1984, Mahathir appointed Daim Zainuddin, a successful businessman and a close 
friend, as his economic advisor.  Under the Malaysian Incorporation Policy, significant 
economic policy reversals which include regressive fiscal (tax and spending) reforms, more 
stringent public expenditure cuts, privatization, deregulation, and financial liberalization were 
implemented (Jomo, 2003).  This policy and the earlier National Economic Policy (NEP),9 
succeeded in creating a small group of super-rich bumiputra (indigenous group) class but failed 
to achieve its main objective of reducing economic inequalities among the indigenous group; 
in fact it actually widened social inequality (Gomez and Jomo, 1999). Other reports highlighted 
that Malaysia’s level of inequality was among the highest reported in the region, with a Gini 
 
7 His ascend to power was just after Margaret Thatcher was elected Prime Minister of Britain in 1979 and Ronald 
Reagan was elected President of the United States in 1980, both of whom are known to be the champions of 
neoliberalism doctrine. 
8 This term is used to refer to the highly free and developed economies of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, 
and Taiwan. 
9 Before 1969, the ruling party adopted a liberal agenda with minimal state intervention which resulted in 
excessive accumulation of wealth by the Chinese ethnic group.  Frustrated with unequal wealth distribution 
coupled with violation of Islamic principles in social and political policies, sparked the May 13 ethnic riot in 1969 
(Hooker and Othman, 2003). Following the riot, Abdul Razak introduced the New Economic Policy (NEP), a 
twenty-year social re-engineering and affirmative action plan to eliminate the identification with economic 
function as well as to increase enterprise ownership by the bumiputra (indigenous group).  
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coefficient10 of 0.49 during 2000 (Netto, 2004), while at the same time the rich are getting 
richer in Malaysia. The widespread poverty in Malay dominated states caused some UMNO 
supporters to question the policies that focused on privatisation and heavy industries run by 
favoured businessmen (Saw and Kesavapany, 2006), including those with family and 
friendship ties. To ease the friction, the ruling party created a ‘new middle-class’ Malay 
professionals (Rahman, 2002) and this frustrated some of the Malay elite groups who 
monopolised most of the country’s concessions or rents, causing them to switch their loyalty 
from UMNO to the opposition party, the Parti Keadilan Rakyat (Malaysian Justice Party) led 
by Anwar Ibrahim.11  
From 1985 onwards, business regulation for inter-ethnic redistribution purposes as 
required under the NEP and the Industrial Coordination Act 1975, was abandoned. This further 
intensification of political patronage with certain bumiputra and non-bumiputra businessmen 
do not only brought mutual benefits to the two groups but also seen as important for the 
development of business interest (Gomez and Jomo, 1999). When the first recession hit in 
1985-1987, many Malaysian corporations, especially those associated with the regime’s 
‘cronies’, were very highly leveraged but they were protected and supported through 
government bailouts to ensure that Mahathir achieved his goals of making Malaysia a fully-
developed industrial country through his Vision 2020 policy (Gomez and Jomo, 1999).   
When the 1997 financial crisis erupted, Mahathir was once again anxious to protect and 
organize bail-outs for the cronies, which led critics to charge that the regime’s cronies were 
doubly blessed – first by benefiting from privatization in the 1980s, and then by walking away 
unscathed from their debts and liabilities through bail-outs using public funds (Jomo, 2003). 
 
10 Gini coefficient: a measurement used to evaluate income inequality where 0 indicates perfect equality and 1.0 
indicates perfect inequality (Worldpress.org).  
11 He was the former Finance Minister, deputy PM and UMNO deputy president who was punished and removed 
from government office in 1998 and imprisoned by Mahathir for sexual impropriety allegations and other 
corruption charges. He is currently serving a 5 year-term after being implicated again for sodomy charge under 
PM Najib’s administration. 
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Mahathir also has an obsession for mega-projects and it was during his time that the Petronas 
Twin Towers, KLIA, Putrajaya and Sepang Grand Prix Circuit were developed. Critics at that 
time expressed doubts that the country’s resources had been put to the best and most productive 
use and some economists were concerned on the financial implications (huge government 
debts) and depleted natural resources for the next generation of Malaysians (Netto, 1999) as a 
result of these mega ventures.   
In short, under Mahathir, Malaysia experienced 20 years of privatizing profits and 
profitable assets and socializing of losses and liabilities (Jomo, 2003).  The perpetrators were 
not made accountable and overly protected which may be attributed to the personalization of 
power by the leadership. Leong (1992, p. 243) commented that “… under the Mahathir 
administration, the Cabinet is no longer used as a forum, but rather as a rubber-stamp institution 
that gives legitimacy to government policies.” Similarly, Leigh (2001, p.7) succinctly 
commented: 
“…the most enduring consequence of the Mahathir era has been a deliberate and decisive 
weakening of Malaysia's institutions, including the judiciary, the royalty, the independent 
civil service, the parliament, the electoral system and....The institutions of governance 
are much weaker, and rulership has been personalized.”  
 
The personalisation of power was achieved by packing the most important posts in the 
cabinet and institutional infrastructure with loyalists, and he himself subsuming another two 
vital posts, home minister and finance minister in 1998. Rigging of the political party’s 
procedures facilitated his personal domination of the hegemonic political organization (Slater, 
2003) and in centralising the ruling party’s power in a few executives’ hands (Gomez, 2004; 
Saw and Kesavapany, 2006).  Circumvention was used in silencing and later ousting the then 
Finance Minister, Anwar Ibrahim, who had opposed to bail-outs using public funds.12 He 
 
12 Mahathir and Daim instructed the Finance Minister, Anwar Ibrahim to suspend KLSE rules to allow the leading 
crony UEM-Renong conglomerate a bailout. That move caused the stock market capitalization to fall by RM 70 
billion, or 20 percent, in three days in November 1997 (Jomo, 2003). These policy divergences between Mahathir 
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appointed Daim as the ‘virtual finance minister’ (Erickson and Shameen, 1998) and also 
allowed himself direct control over a variety of discretionary funds to prepare strategic bailouts 
for his key allies in the corporate sector (Slater, 2003).  
In the next section we present a case as evidence on how neoliberalism ideology and 
personalisation of power by a political leader facilitated the production of corruption in a state-
owned enterprise. The research was conducted through scrutinizing newspaper articles, website 
commentaries, books and journal articles related to the company and major actors. Although 
there are other scandals involving state-owned companies in Malaysia, we chose Perwaja Steel 
as our case as it was one of the largest scandals at a time when personalisation of power had 
just started to develop.  
 
3. Production of corruption in Perwaja Steel 
3.1 Company background 
Perwaja Terengganu was formed on 22 April 1982 with a paid up capital of RM 250 million 
as a joint-venture between the government agency, Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia 
(Hicom Ltd) and Nippon Steel Corp.13 The project was meant to be the crowning jewel of the 
industrialization drive under Mahathir’s Look East policy. The Japanese company built a billet-
making plant and a direct-reduction facility to smelt ore into hot briquetted iron based on a new 
technology. The direct-reduction plant never functioned properly and by 1986, the joint-
venture project accumulated losses of RM 131 million. This was attributed to management 
problems and appreciation of the Japanese yen which affected its interest payments on a yen 
loan totaling RM 815 million (The Malay Mail, 10 February 2004). In 1987, Nippon Steel gave 
up its 30 percent stake in the company and Hicom was stripped of its 51 percent stake, ending 
 
and Anwar had caused the latter a heavy price. In 1998, Anwar was imprisoned for five years on sodomy 
allegation. 
13 Hicom owned 51%, Nippon 30% and Terengganu state government 19%. 
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with the Malaysian government owning 81% of Perwaja Terengganu's equity and 19% held by 
the Terengganu state government. In 1987, Mahathir handpicked his trusted associate, Eric 
Chia,14 to spend six months in the company to report why the project was failing. In 1988, Eric 
was formally appointed as the managing director of Perwaja Teregganu and during this period, 
more than 10 proposals were received by the government to turn the RM 1.2 billion plant into 
a profitable venture but it was left to become insolvent in 1988.  
Based on a 10-year plan and with fresh capital from government funding and commercial 
loans from Bank Bumiputra15 (RM 860 million) and the Employee Provident Fund (EPF-RM 
130 million), a new company, Perwaja Steel was set up in 1989. Eric and his board of directors, 
who included representatives from the Finance Ministry, were tasked with rehabilitating the 
project. In 1991, the company recorded its first accounting profit and Mahathir used the event 
to silence critics on his aggressive mega projects adventure. In 1995, Eric resigned abruptly 
from the company16 and a year later, a pre-tax loss of RM 376.54 million was reported, claimed 
to be due to the expansion project involving the building of a rolling mill. Despite the loss, the 
company managed to secure a second syndicated loan of RM 600 million approved by EPF in 
1996. When Eric left the company in 1995, it had accumulated RM 10 billion in debts and 
losses, involving current liabilities of RM 9.26 million, long-term loans of RM 6.013 billion, 
and losses amounting to RM 2.985 billion (News Straits Times, 28 March 2003).  Table 1 
presents the status of the company’s financial position in 1995. 
 
Table 1 Summary of Perwaja Finances in 1995 
 
 
14 He is a Singapore-born Chinese entrepreneur who became a successful and prominent businessman in Malaysia. 
He came to Malaysia at the age of 23 and managed United Motor Works (UMW) set up by his father. The company 
became the country’s largest engineering group. He established strong friendship with Mahathir who supported 
his business through major government contracts. In 1987, he helped rescue a haulage and logistic company set 
up by Mahathir. He was nicknamed Mr Fixit as he is often called upon to help the political elites when their 
businesses are in trouble (The Staronline, June 25, 2008).  
15 UMNO is a major shareholder of the bank. 
16 In an interview after being released from conviction, he revealed that he had received a letter from a senior 
official asking him to resign due to ill health. 
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Indebted     
Major Malaysian lenders to Perwaja RM million  Yr of Maturity 
Bumiputra Merchant Bankers (syndicated loan) 135  2003 
Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd. 430  2004 
Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd. 270  2007 
Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd. 600  2000 
Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd. 600  2002 
Employees Provident Fund 710  2001 
Bills to pay    
Perwaja by the numbers:    
 End of 1998  End of 1997 
Direct loans owed to the government RM 4,015m  RM 3,174m 
Outstanding loans guaranteed by government (Local & Foreign) RM 5,122m  RM 5,682m 
Major Foreign Lenders to Perwaja    
 RM million  Yr of Maturity 
IBJ Leasing Services (Panama) Inc. 199.3  2003 
Standard Chartered Bank (Labuan) 1,520  2002 
Japanese Banking Consortium 685.5  2003 
 
Source: Lopez (2000) based on Malaysian government sources. 
 
 
Anwar Ibrahim, the former Finance Minister, instructed an independent audit firm, 
Coopers and Lybrand to examine Perwaja Terengganu’s 1988 insolvency status.  Following 
the report received from the audit firm, Anwar disclosed in parliament that the actual loss was 
RM 2.9 billion and made a police report.  A government probe order was then issued on 10 
April 1996 and the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA, now known as Malaysian Anti-Corruption 
Commission (MACC)) started investigating the company’s audited report for possible 
malpractices which had contributed to the loss. Furthermore, the new management of Perwaja 
Steel prepared an internal report where it alleged among others, the following: inaccurate 
accounting records, unauthorised contracts amounting to hundreds of millions of ringgit, 
misappropriation of funds, dubious maintenance contracts amounting to RM 292 million 
(including a contract amount of RM 200,000 per month to a company for gardening, cleaning 
and vehicle maintenance), and award of RM 957 million contract to companies of a long time 
associate of Eric Chia (WTF, 15 December 2011). 
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On 16 June 1997, Perwaja Steel was handed over to two cronies: Abu Sahid of Maju 
Holdings, who took a 51% stake saw it as an opportunity to be known as a steel man, and the 
Pheng family of Kinsteel who took over the remaining to thwart threat to their own steel 
operations business. In 2008, Perwaja Holdings was listed on the main board of Bursa Malaysia 
and Perwaja Steel became its 100% subsidiary. EPF filed suit against Perwaja Steel for RM 4.5 
billion and it went into receivership in December 2014. Table 2 illustrates the chronology of 
the emergence & demise of Perwaja Steel. 
 
Table 2 Chronology of the Emergence & Demise of Perwaja Steel 
1982 1987 & 1988 1989 1995 & 1996 1997 2008 2014 
Perwaja 
Terengganu 
Perwaja 
Terengganu 
Perwaja Steel 
MD –Eric 
Chia 
Perwaja Steel 
Eric Chia 
resigned in 
1995 
Perwaja Steel 
 
Perwaja Steel 
became 100% 
subsidiary of 
Perwaja Bhd 
Perwaja 
Steel went 
into 
receivership 
Hicom 
(51%), 
Nippon 
(30%) & 
Terengganu 
state govt. 
(19%) 
Federal govt. 
(81%) & 
Terengganu 
state govt. 
(19%) 
Federal govt. 
(81%) & 
Terengganu 
state govt. 
(19%) 
Federal govt. 
(81%) & 
Terengganu 
state govt. 
(19%) 
Maju 
Holdings 
(51%) & 
Kinsteel 
(49%) 
 
Kinsteel 
owns 37% of 
Perwaja Bhd 
 
RM 250m 
paid-up 
capital & 
RM 500m 
loan from 
Export-
Import 
Bank of 
Japan 
 
Reported 
loss of RM 
131m in 
1986 & in 
1988 
reported 
total 
accumulated 
loss of RM 
1.2b & 
became 
insolvent in 
1988 
New 
company set 
up through 
govt. funding 
& loans from 
Bank 
Bumiputra 
(RM860 m) 
and EPF 
(RM130 
million) 
 
Reported pre-
tax loss of RM 
376.54m in 
1996. Secured 
funding of RM 
600m loan 
from EPF.  
Total 
accumulated 
losses of RM 
2.5b, long-term 
loans of RM 6b 
& current 
liabilities of 
RM 1b 
 Perwaja Bhd 
listed on 
main board of 
Bursa 
Malaysia 
EPF filed 
suit for RM 
4.5b 
  
 
 
Mahathir’s neoliberalism ideology of Malaysia Incorporation (Jomo, 2003) made him 
pursue an aggressive industrialization and privatisation agenda with the rhetoric of matching 
the other Asian Tigers regardless of the impact on the democratic process. Despite the project 
15 
showing many signs of failure, he kept injecting more public funds into the ‘pet’ project as he 
perceive it as too important to fail to safe his ego and also to ward off increasing criticisms 
from his opponents. He turned to neoliberalist cronies for advice and support and in return 
promised protecting their interests by utilizing the infrastructural power. This supports the 
arguments by Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) and Sikka (2015) that neoliberalism ideology 
legitimises competitive beings to indulge in endless pursuit as sign of success.  
 
3.2 Deployment of power and production of corruption 
Although the ACA’s probe on Perwaja Steel started in 1996, no one had been implicated until 
9th October 2004, when Eric Chia was arrested and charged for criminal breach of trust during 
the premiership of Abdullah Badawi. Eric was alleged to have dishonestly authorised payment 
of RM 76.4 million to the account of Frilsham Enterprise Incorporated (Frilsham) with the 
American Express Bank Ltd in Hong Kong for technical assistance agreement (TAA) provided 
to the Perwaja plant by a Japanese company, NKK Corporation, when in fact no such payments 
were due to these companies.  He was also alleged to have instructed payment of the same 
amount without the approval of the board of directors nor the tendering committee of the 
Perwaja Rolling Mill and Development.  The offence was alleged to have been committed in 
his capacity as the managing director of Perwaja Steel between 4th November 1993 and 22nd 
February 1994.  
The ACA's failure to wrap up its investigation sooner and nab the perpetrators 
responsible for the RM 10 billion staggering losses at Perwaja Steel has been criticized by 
members of both the opposition and the ruling National Front (BN) coalition. Unlike in most 
countries, the ACA was under the Prime Minister’s Department which thus diminishes its 
power to act independently since investigation of the case began during Mahathir’s 
premiership. The timing of the arrest and allegation also raised further questions as Eric’s 
16 
detention was not related to the huge debt and losses suffered by the company to bring the 
perpetrators to justice but rather a political ploy ahead of the 2004 general election.  
 
Fig. 1. Deployment of Power and Production of Corruption  
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the packing and circumventing strategies in the case of the ACA and utilising the rigging 
strategy in determining his successors (i.e. Abdullah Badawi & also the current PM, Najib 
Razak) to ensure that he will not be implicated.  During the court proceedings, the weak internal 
control system and the working of a covert power became more apparent.  Figure 1 illustrates 
the main actors and their roles in the case. 
The former senior group general manager, Ahmad Zaini, in his comments on the case 
stated that although the TAA was meant to be free, the payment was made to Frilsham 
Enterprise’s account in the American Express Bank in Hong Kong following Eric Chia’s 
approval (News Straits Times, 18 September 2004). In his financial report, Ahmad Zaini went 
on to state that the general manager of NKK Corporation, N. Otani, had confirmed in writing 
in a letter dated 11 October 1995 that Frilsham was not its associate company, hence NKK’s 
Otani did not sign any payment request letter but this letter was not produced in court. On the 
contrary, Akram Che Ayub, the former group senior operations manager, stated that the TAA 
was not free and that the request for payments should be staggered rather than paid in one lump 
sum.  A request letter for the payment bearing the signature of Otani dated 17 February 1994 
was confirmed by Akram to be different from that on the TAA and the addendum (News Straits 
Times, 14 August 2004). A letter instructing one lump sum payment to be remitted to Frislham’s 
account with the American Express Bank Ltd in Hong Kong had been made through Bank 
Bumiputera in Malaysia on 22 February 1994 (The Malay Mail, 14 August 2004). Lim Chaing 
Cheah, a former corporate director who instructed the payment, stated that he was ordered by 
Eric to proceed with it despite the absence of any supporting documents to justify the said 
payment.  Lim further pointed out that it was customary in the company that all payments17 
made should first be authorised by Eric and countersigned by him. Lim said:  
“For example when a request for payment comes from overseas, we notify the 
 
17 Payments for projects, constructions of plants, purchasing of raw materials and services that include 
technological consultancy (The Malay Mail, 3 August 2004). 
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managing director’s people. Once approval is given, we get the finance and 
accounting department to process it” (The Malay Mail, 3 August 2004). 
 
Interestingly, the demised Arthur Andersen, the company’s external auditor, had all along 
issued ‘unqualified’ audit report until the company became insolvent.  The clean audit report 
on the company’s financial position had been presented to the board of directors on 31 March 
1994 and was approved during the annual general meeting (The Malay Mail, 3 August 2004).  
The responsibilities of Perwaja Steel’s corporate directors surpassed four pertinent departments 
viz. finance and accounting, administrative, corporate banking and management information 
system (The Malay Mail, 3 August 2004), hence suggesting weak internal control system and 
poor corporate governance. The fact that the external auditor failed to probe further on the 
missing document suggests either incompetency or some involvement in the malpractice. 
However, a pertinent question in all this is the rationale of a Japanese company (NKK) 
requesting payments for its services to be made to the bank account of its associate company 
(Frilsham) in Hong Kong rather than directly to it. The scandal worsened when NKK was later 
found to be non-existent (The Malay Mail, 10 February, 2004) and that Frilsham’s account at 
American Express Bank in Hong Kong was closed on 28th July 1994 i.e. about five months 
after the RM 76.4 million was paid into the account (News Straits Times, 17 September 2004). 
Australasian Business Intelligence (23 May 2002) reported that the payment appeared to have 
benefitted Sakyo Corporation, a company associated with Shahril, the son of Shamsuddin 
Abdul Kadir,18 a crony of Mahathir who was also closely linked to Eric Chia. While the use of 
Frilsham as an intermediary company or SPV may be deemed to be a cover up, this was made 
possible as Hong Kong is considered as one of the most lenient countries with loose 
regulations. In other words, the production of corrupt transactions and the choice of a safe 
haven to conceal the fraudulent act were the consequence of the adopted neoliberalism 
 
18 He was a former engineer with Malaysian Telecommunication Department who retired in 1971 and started a 
family control company, Sapura Holdings, which bought UMW from Eric Chia.  
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ideology, facilitated by the personalization of power that has weakened the various check and 
balance infrastructures in Malaysia. 
The court proceedings further revealed of a covert power in action. Eric, in a letter 
addressed to the Chairman of Perwaja Steel, Zainal Abidin Sulong, in the minutes of the 
board’s meeting held on 30 March 1996, clearly stated that: (1) he was answerable only to the 
Prime Minister (PM-Mahathir); (2) he was mandated by the PM to operate Perwaja as if it 
belonged to him; (3) he implemented projects only after the PM had granted approval; (4) he 
received no salary or benefits from Perwaja during his service; and (5) his service as managing 
director in Perwaja is determined by the PM.  This clearly indicates Mahathir’s success in 
creating loyalist cronies like Eric who is willing to implicate himself rather than to risk his 
‘friendship’ with Mahathir.  
According to the minutes of the board of directors meeting on 4 July 1993, it was reported 
that Eric informed the board that he had met Anwar Ibrahim, the Finance Minister the day 
before (i.e. 3 July 1993) who agreed to waive a circular19 dated 6 August 1985 which requires 
all companies under the government to get approval for any tenders amounting RM 15 million 
and above.  Eric also suggested for the formation of a tendering committee20 comprising of 
himself as the chairman together with the other two directors, Nik Mohamad Affandi and Zubir 
Embong. The board unanimously approved the procedure for the purchases and awards of 
contracts as directed by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and proposal for the tendering 
committee.  The board’s chairman, Zainal Abidin Sulong, further reported that the board also 
approved Eric to conclude purchases and contracts without referring to the tendering committee 
for consumable goods like electrodes, scrap, iron ore, lubricants, etc., and any contracts of RM 
5 million and below. Ironically, another former board director who was also the MOF’s 
 
19 The Circular: is a strict financial guideline which requires companies in which the Government owns at least 
51% equity, to keep the MOF informed on projects, tenders, and purchases at the initial stage of negotiations. 
20 The tender committee needs to approve all contracts or purchase of RM 15 million or above. 
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representative on the board, Nik Mohd Affandi Nik Yusoff, told the court that the MOF had 
never forced the company to activate its tendering committee and he also disagreed with some 
parts of the minutes of meeting which stated that the MOF had agreed to exempt the company 
from seeking approval for purchases and contracts of RM 15 million and above.  These are not 
the comments of equal parties to a commercial transaction, hence implying a calculated 
paternalism.  Furthermore, evidence shows all these liberal gestures were being carefully 
recorded as part of an accounting process directed at securing contracts. In a nutshell, Mahathir 
has not only managed to pack the company with loyalists but more importantly, to circumvent 
the infrastructural power of the MOF by frustrating the rules in place. The establishment of the 
ad hoc National Economic Action Council, headed by Mahathir’s closest ally, Daim, was 
further evidence of circumvention of Anwar's power in restraining the usage of public funds to 
rescue and support cronies in trouble. 
When the Anti-Corruption Agency’s (ACA) investigating officer, Han Chee Rull, was 
asked by the court if he had (1) obtained recorded statement from the PM, (2) seen the 
correspondence between Eric Chia and the PM, (3) knew about the PM’s visit to the NKK’s 
plant in Japan before the TAA was signed, and (4) Eric Chia’s three suits that had been filed 
against NKK Corporation, Lim Guan Eng and The Malay Mail, he confirmed that no recorded 
statement was taken from Mahathir and that he was unaware of the other three issues.  The 
admission of unawareness on the many incidents related to the accused Eric Chia by the ACA 
investigating officer responsible in handling the case, implied some form of subjugation and 
control of the course of justice by Mahathir. As mentioned earlier, the packing and 
circumvention strategies by locating the ACA under the PM’s Department constrain the 
effectiveness of the agency to act independently and to remain subservient to the leadership. 
Rais Yatim, the then Minister in the PM’s Department, reported that the Swiss 
Government was prepared to cooperate with the Malaysian authorities in probing the missing 
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Perwaja Steel’s money in Swiss bank accounts (The Malay Mail, 3 August 2004) and that the 
ACA, under the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Bill 2002, can make an official request 
to freeze the bank accounts of those allegedly involved in the scandal.  He further reported that 
3 senior ACA officers went to Zurich and Japan to find the last piece of evidence to wrap up 
the investigations.  However, the ACA officers claimed that they did not get cooperation from 
the Zurich bank and the Japanese banking authorities, hence the vital evidence could not be 
sought. Rais’s comments on Mahathir’s relative invisibility in the case ensured he was able to 
maintain friendly ‘relations’ with the powerful leader of the ruling party. The PM’s office is 
packed with loyalists and it serves as the nerve centre in rewarding loyalists and punishing 
opponents.  
In 2007, Eric was acquitted of the charges by the Judge, Akhtar Tahir, who said that the 
prosecution had failed to establish a prima facie case against Eric on two grounds. Firstly, 
failure to call two material witnesses, former secretary of Perwaja Steel, Durai Rajasingam, 
and the five Japanese witnesses including the director of NKK Corporation, N. Otani. The 
Judge raised his concerns on the uncalled witnesses respectively, saying: 
 
“...Yet the prosecution never called him [Rajasingam]. The question is why? I see nothing 
to say that he would be a hostile witness or give evidence against them.........I wonder 
whether it was the Japanese witnesses who were reluctant or the prosecution was the one 
reluctant to bring them here..” (Thestaronline, 27 June 2007). 
 
Secondly, the conflicts in the tendering documents – the prosecution insisted that the TAA was 
free but when tendering its document at the trial, they stated the agreements would be effective 
upon receiving the first payment while NKK Corporation’s document stated the amount should 
be paid in one lump sum. The release of Eric Chia from all the criminal breach of trust charges 
on 26 June 2007 (Thestaronline, 27 June 2007) provided some form of comfort for the other 
perpetrators who have links with political patronage as they will escape the law. The judiciary 
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was one of the earliest (since 1988) institutions packed by Mahathir in order to enhance his 
infrastructural power and Eric’s trial was seen by critics as another ‘wayang’ (theatrical act).   
The Perwaja Steel fraud case which dragged for 11 years (from 1996 until 2007) was 
indeed one of the country’s longest investigations.  The involvement of foreign institutions and 
powerful individuals was blamed for the case being dragged for so long.  While this might be 
true due to the nature of the case, it may also be seen as a tactic used by the relevant parties as 
a massive cover up exercise hoping that people will forget about it with the passing of time 
(Grenfell, 1979). Table 3 summarises the chronology of events on the role of Mahathir and his 
cronies in the production of corruption and how he used the state apparatus and his loyal cronies 
and other political elites to ensure he was never implicated nor referred to in the Perwaja Steel 
fiasco. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Chronology of events of the Perwaja debacle 
 
Year Events 
Neoliberalism & Personalisation of 
power by an autocrat 
1982 Perwaja Terengganu was established as a joint 
venture between the government and Nippon 
Steel Corp of Japan in the east coast of 
Malaysia although steel was consumed in huge 
volumes in the west coast, which clearly is a 
recipe for disaster. 
 
Mahathir justified his decision by claiming 
that he was taking industrialisation to the 
east coast of Malaysia to help develop the 
state. 
1986 Perwaja Terengganu accumulated losses of 
RM 131 million.  
Mahathir blamed it on appreciation of the 
yen and not on poor management skills of 
his inexperienced cronies in the steel sector.  
 
1987 Eric Chia mandated to investigate why the 
project failed.  
Mahathir used Eric as his Mr Fixit to help 
rescue his failing pet project.  
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1988 Perwaja Terengganu went into solvency. 
 
Mahathir did not want to admit failure of his 
project, hence rejected proposals to turn 
around the company to profitable venture.  
 
1988 Perwaja Steel was established and Eric was 
appointed as managing director. 
 
Mahathir used one of the state agencies, 
EPF to provide syndicated loan to help Eric 
managed the new company. Representatives 
from MOF sat on the board of the company. 
 
1991 Perwaja Steel recorded its first profit. 
 
Mahathir used the event to justify that his 
action in appointing Eric to manage his new 
project was correct to ward off criticisms on 
his mega projects. 
 
1995 Eric Chia resigned from Perwaja Steel. 
 
Mahathir ordered Eric to resign.  
 
1996 Perwaja Steel reported a pre-tax loss of RM 
376.54 million. 
 
Mahathir used EPF for the second time to 
provide syndicated loan. 
1996 Anwar Ibrahim disclosed in parliament 
Perwaja’s actual loss to be RM2.9 billion 
based on the report by Coopers & Lybrand 
who was tasked to investigate Perwaja 
Terengganu’s insolvency status. 
 
Anwar instructed ACA to begin 
investigation on the company’s audited 
report by Arthur Andersen for possible 
malpractices and fraud that have contributed 
to the loss.  
1997 Maju Holdings Sdn Bhd bought 51% stake in 
Perwaja Steel. 
 
Mahathir helped another of his Malay crony, 
Abu Sahid to acquire the business and only 
in 2003 the deal was inked and for the 
company to assume control. 
 
1998 Anwar Ibrahim was expelled from the 
government as he was against injecting public 
funds on failing projects and those that do not 
benefit society. 
 
Mahathir used the judiciary institution to 
imprison Anwar for sodomy allegation and 
other corruption charges. 
2004  Eric was arrested and charged of criminal 
breach of trust involving RM 76.4 million.  
 
Abdullah Badawi who superseded Mahathir 
used Eric’s detention as a political ploy 
ahead of the 2004’s general election rather 
than actually bringing the culprit to justice. 
 
2007 Eric was acquitted by the judge.  
 
The prosecution team failed to bring the key 
witnesses and produced conflicting 
documents causing the case to be dropped. 
 
 
 
4. Reflections and conclusion 
Combating corruption on both the demand and supply side requires understanding of the 
context and logic of the actors conducting the affairs in modern societies. In developing 
countries, economic policies and actions are often in the hands of the political elites and the 
doctrine of neoliberalism has been a convenient vehicle in legitimising their exercise of power 
in turning the state’s assets into private enterprises and in deregulating economic activities, as 
well as in empowering themselves and their cronies in defending their decisions and outcomes. 
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The main criticism on the symbiotic relationship between the political elites and business 
cronies is the excessive misuse of power to the degree that it corrupts the economic and political 
principles of public service (Sikka, 2008; Bakre, 2008). Hence, any effort at curbing corruption 
requires scrutiny of the political ambition and democratic spirit of the ‘tone at the top’. When 
a country is allowed to be run by an increasingly authoritarian personality without constraints 
on the despotic power, then the country’s institutional infrastructure that provides the check 
and balance may be weakened by the aspiring autocrat through various means of 
personalisation of power (Slater, 2003).  
We demonstrate, using Perwaja Steel as a case study, how a political leader’s form of 
neoliberalism ideology helped him pursue his aggressive industrialization agenda by turning to 
his cronies and political loyalists to help realize his ambitions and visions. He facilitated 
political elites to form a small interlocking group to accumulate wealth either individually or 
collectively. Such interlocking state cannot be maintained in competitive market but when 
political elites and crony capitalists are entwined, then corrupt and incompetent political elites 
can maintain the small-hub network by colluding through the awards of tenders or projects 
within their networks. More importantly, we show how personalization of power through the 
strategies of packing, rigging and circumventing have weakened the institutional infrastructure 
such as the judiciary, anti-corruption agencies, and police, that provides the check and balance 
in protecting public interest.  
The nature of fraudulent in a state-owned company is understandably different than in 
public or family owned business. The failure and scandals of state-owned companies in 
Malaysia have escalated since the 1980s (Malaysian Airlines, Port Klang Free Zone, etc.) and 
this can be attributed to the ‘bossism’ political leadership and the control of the economic 
machinery. The latest scandal in 2015 is the 1MDB, a sovereign wealth fund set up in 2009 by 
the current Prime Minister, Najib.  All these scandals share the same modus operandi and if 
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the root of the problem i.e. the autocratic leadership is not tackled, then corruption in the 
country will continue.  
Our study is not without limitations. Firstly, we present an in-depth analysis of only 
one case study of a failed state-owned company in Malaysia. Future studies can adopt multiple-
case study method to show the commonality and differences of the main actors, collaborators 
and institutions involved in the production of corruption. Secondly, our case study analysis 
relies on secondary data and future research may use interviews with members of political 
parties, lawyers, accountants, and this will provide better voices on the corruption problem.  
Thirdly, we did not discuss the preventive strategies suitable for the country and hence, future 
studies may consider this. Fourthly, as a multiracial and multi-religious nation, the underlying 
philosophical and ethical doctrines for conducting economic activities other than neoliberalism 
may be considered.  
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